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This paper addresses the nature of the difficulties MBEs face when con­
ducting business with large companies through MBE purchasing programs. 
Data collected from MBEs and purchasing personnel were analyzed with lo­
gistic regression to demonstrate that MBEs and their corporate purchasing 
counterparts have different perceptions across human, environmental, and or­
ganizational dimensions of transaction cost economics. These differences help 
to explain the problems: (1) that MBEs have in selling to large companies and 
the problems that MBEs and purchasing personnel have in implementing MBE 
purchasing programs; (2) of reaching agreement in the marketplace; and, (3) 
of collectively pursuing the economic development of the minority business 
community. We offer recommendations for improving the relationship between 
these parties.
Introduction
The development of a strong and independent minority business sector has 
been recognized as a major societal priority by all levels of government, the 
business community, and communities of racial minorities (Bates & Furino, 
1985).'The federal government, for example, requires large corporations with
1 This study was funded by the Center for Advanced Purchasing Studies, Arizona State Univer­
sity, Tempe, AZ.
Spring 1996 Wimbush, et. al: Minority Business Enterprises 43
government contracts to contract and procure from minority business enter­
prises (MBEs). According to Public Law 95-507 of 1978, contractors must re­
port the percentage of their business that is allocated to small minority firms. 
The more directive Public Law 99-661 of 1986 requires Department of De­
fense contractors to purchase at least five percent of their business from small 
minority enterprises that are owned and operated by black, native, hispanic, 
and Asian/pacific Americans. However, each of these legislative mandates has 
been severely narrowed due to two recent Supreme Court rulings. In Richmond 
v Croson 1989 (Gray and Peery, 1990; Rice, 1991) the court ruled that states 
must demonstrate specific patterns of discriminatory purchasing in order to 
justify set-asides. In Adarand v Pena 1995 (Mydans, 1995) the court applied 
the strict test of Croson to the federal government.
But, in addition to federal legislation, programs have been established to 
provide minority business enterprises with opportunities for greater access to 
the mainstream of American business. To this end, hundreds of corporations 
not under federal mandate voluntarily pursue minority suppliers and vendors 
to increase opportunities for MBEs, to generate minority employment, and to 
be socially responsible (Spratlen, 1978; Dollinger and Daily, 1989). Whether 
the action is voluntary or due to legislative mandate, the goal is for large com­
panies to promote full participation of minorities in the American economic 
system.
Although the establishment of relationships between large companies and 
MBEs is an indication of progress compared to the nature of the relationship 
several years ago, for many businesses, the MBE/large company relationship 
is wrought with problems. Thus, attempts to meet legal requirements and vol­
untary efforts to aid in the economic development of minority businesses of­
ten end in failure and frustration for all parties (Dollinger, Enz and Daily, 
1991; Bates, 1985; Dowst, 1981; Giunipero, 1980).
This paper focuses on one aspect of the effort towards improving oppor­
tunities for MBEs in corporate America: the nature of the difficulties small mi­
nority businesses have when conducting business with large companies through 
MBE purchasing programs. To this end we try to identify the reasons why the 
programs have not been as successful as they were expected to be by examin­
ing the perceptions of MBEs and their corporate counterparts, corporate pur­
chasing personnel (CPPs), on key variables which affect the relationship. An 
understanding of the problems which exist between MBEs and CPPs in a pur­
chasing relationship will enable mechanisms to be devised to improve their 
working relationships and, concomitantly, improve the role of the purchasing 
programs. The theoretical framework and perspective for the study is based 
on transaction costs economics (TCE) theory. According to TCE, high trans­
action costs impose a burden on the parties to a transaction, above and be­
yond issues such as price, quality, and delivery. This burden can prove to be 
an impediment to bringing the buyer and vendor together; a burden which may 
cause the negotiation process to break down (Williamson, 1975; 1981; Coase,
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1952; Simon, 1957; Thompson, 1967). Thus, the major research question we 
address is: Do MBEs and CPPs differ in their perceptions of the various costs 
of doing business; and, if so, does it impact the likelihood of successful trans­
actions?
We will proceed to address the research question by: (1) briefly describ­
ing TCE and how it provides the basis for understanding the nature of the 
MBE/CPP relationship; (2) discussing how the major factors which influence 
transaction costs affect the MBE/CPP relationship; (3) suggesting avenues 
which may be taken to*improve the MBE/CPP relationship; and, (4) providing 
implications for research and practice.
Transaction Costs Economics and the MBE/CPP Relationship
TCE and its Basis for MBE Purchasing Programs
Transaction cost economics combines elements of organizational theory 
and microeconomics to explain market failure (Walker & Weber, 1984). Trans­
actions are the transfer of goods and services between technologically sepa­
rate units, and ‘transaction costs’ are the costs associated with exchanges that 
vary independent of the prices of the goods and services sold (Robbins, 1987). 
According to Ouchi (1980, p. 130), transaction costs foster cooperation be­
tween parties who enter into an economic exchange arrangement. These costs 
are usually the result of difficulty in determining the value of the goods or 
services being exchanged, or from a lack of trust between the parties—a lack 
of trust which may stem from the uncertainty associated with engaging in new 
relationships. Because parties to a transaction rarely have identical goals, an 
interdependency must be established to develop trust between the parties and 
to assure each party to the transaction a cooperative arrangement.
A lack of trust may very well exist between MBEs and CPPs who have 
not entered into previous working relationships. Large companies are concerned 
about whether MBEs will be able to deliver the agreed upon services at or 
within the agreed upon time period, the quality of the services or goods ren­
dered, and the overall stability of the MBE. Especially if the MBE folds dur­
ing the contract period or even after the goods or services have been deliv­
ered, the CPP may have substantial problems with future procurements, resolv­
ing any problems which develop with the already delivered goods or services, 
procuring replacement parts, or with obtaining follow-up service. In an attempt 
to alleviate these problems, according to TCE theory, if mistrust exists then 
the mistrusting party will want, even demand, additional contractual protections 
(Ouchi, 1980). However, placing costly, extra contractual obligations upon the 
MBEs may foster in the MBE a mistrust of the large companies. The MBEs 
mistrust in the large company may also stem from a feeling of vulnerability 
because the large company could decline to renew a contract after the MBE 
has undertaken the major expense to meet the company’s needs. Thus, due to 
a lack of trust, there would be a certain anxiety, if not reluctance, on the part
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of both parties about entering into a relationship. While the lack of trust is 
costly to both parties, however, we would argue that the cost is likely to be 
greater for MBEs than large companies.
Corporate purchasing programs were developed to facilitate an exchange 
arrangement between the MBEs and large companies. The arrangement is con­
sistent with TCE theory for these programs were established to eliminate bar­
riers which may hinder the development of a relationship between the parties. 
The purpose of the program is to reduce the uncertainty which fosters the 
mistrust at most, and concern at the very least, about the performance and 
sustenance of MBEs.
Major Factors Which Influence Transaction Costs
TCE theory specifies that the costs of contracting across a market can 
vary by three factors: human decision makers, properties of the markets (en­
vironmental factors), and the internal structures (organizational factors) of the 
firms (Pearson, Fawcett and Cooper, 1993). If the costs of overcoming these 
factors are too high or the gap between the parties too large, no contract will 
be forthcoming. This type of situation defines market failure.
Human factors. The major human factors which may lead to market fail­
ure are complexity and opportunism. Complexity refers to the limits people 
experience in formulating and solving problems and in processing information. 
People intend to be rational, but when there is a great deal of complexity, ra­
tionality may be difficult. Perceptions and values may differ, adding to the 
complexity (Enz, Dollinger and Daily, 1990). The presence of complexity leads 
to high contracting costs (e.g., time consuming negotiations, legal expenses, 
etc.). However, the costs imposed by complexity may be borne more heavily 
by the MBE than the CPP of a large company because the owner of a rela­
tively small MBE probably participates in the work flow of the business, per­
forms and supervises several tasks, and represents the firm in major negotia­
tions with CPPs. The purchasing agent, on the other hand, has significantly 
fewer duties—all of which are related to procuring a narrow set of special­
ized items. To reduce complexity, the purchasing agent can often refer to a 
purchasing manual of procedures or call upon staff specialists to sort out the 
details of complex specifications or contracts. The MBE does not have these 
resources at her or his disposal and, therefore, must readily engage in com­
plex information processing in which multiple concepts related to both pro­
curement and other tasks associated with the business must be juggled simul­
taneously.
Opportunism, too, may affect MBEs and CPPs differentially. Opportun­
ism represents shrewd, egoistic behavior whereby, people act according to their 
own exclusive self-interest without regard for the impact their actions have on 
their employer, peers, customers, employer’s competitors, or society-at-large. 
People who intentionally make inaccurate statements and empty promises, for 
example, are behaving opportunistically. The consequences of opportunistic be-
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havior may affect the MBE more severely than the CPP. Most companies with 
MBE purchasing programs, for example, espouse the importance of the 
program’s contribution to corporate objectives. However, all agents, including 
CPPs, are susceptible to the moral hazard of acting in their own personal best 
interests which may diverge from corporate objectives. The presence of op­
portunism, then, can lead to increased costs of monitoring transactions, audit­
ing contracts and/or structuring incentives so that agents’ motives coincide with 
corporate objectives. In addition, corporate purchasing personnel can mislead 
MBEs. The false promise of a large contract can result in the overextension 
of an MBE’s financial and operating resources. The sudden cancellation of an 
on-going relationship without explanation by the CPP can devastate the MBE. 
So, while MBE opportunism is little threat to the survival and success of a 
large company, many forms of corporate opportunism can have major detri­
mental consequences for the MBE. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
HI: Due to resource differences, complexity of contracting is per­
ceived to be higher by the MBE than by CPPs.
H2: The threats to survival due to opportunistic behaviors are per­
ceived to be higher by MBEs than by CPPs.
Environmental factors. The major environmental factors which influence 
transaction costs are the presence of small numbers of MBEs and uncertainty 
about their performance. Small numbers can increase searching costs for pur­
chasing personnel since MBEs in certain industries and geographical areas 
are hard to find or do not even exist. Pearson et al (1993) reported that in­
creasing minority business visibility was a major objective of minority firms. 
The small numbers problem makes renegotiation of MBE contracts more 
challenging and awkward because a buyer will not want to lose a high per­
forming MBE knowing how difficult it will be to replace that firm in the 
buyer’s portfolio. Moreover, many CPPs have no experience at all in deal­
ing with minority firms. This unfamiliarity increases the time and energy that 
CPPs must devote to understanding the MBE firm. Lastly, the sparsity of 
MBE firms in certain geographic/industry areas places a strategic constraint 
on the buyer. Having multiple MBEs from which to choose will help to fos­
ter a favorable degree of competition among the MBE firms, enabling the 
large companies to receive the best service or goods. Thus, corporate pur­
chasing programs may work best where there are a number of firms avail­
able to large companies.
Performance uncertainty refers to the managerial and technical ability of 
the parties to fulfill the specifications of the contract. For many minority 
owned firms, the opportunity to do business within an MBE purchasing pro­
gram may be the big “break” that turns a struggling business into a profitable 
one. This makes it necessary for the MBE to minimize the perception of per-
formance uncertainty when pursuing corporate contracts. However, larger vol­
umes, strict performance tolerances, and short deadlines can prove to be chal­
lenges that tax the resources of the MBE. These uncertainties can impose costs 
on CPP which can jeopardize the contract. Uncertainty may lead to increased 
monitoring of MBE firms, increased inspection, and the provision of training 
and managerial assistance for MBEs. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H3: Due to the small number of MBEs, the costs of finding and un­
derstanding MBEs is perceived to be higher by CPPs than by 
MBEs.
H4: Due to managerial and technical ability, performance uncer­
tainty is perceived to be higher by the CPPs than by the MBEs.
Organizational factors. The major organizational factors which can poten­
tially increase transaction costs are information asymmetry and negotiation at­
mosphere. When asymmetry is present, the party to the transaction without the 
needed information has to incur a cost to procure this information (or negoti­
ate a suboptimal contract). Information asymmetry may affect either the cor­
poration or the MBE, but is likely to be a larger problem for the MBEs. Buy­
ers have information costs related to finding, certifying the qualifications, and 
monitoring the performance of MBEs. But, MBEs face an even higher cost. 
They typically are not a part of the network which provides advance notice 
and information concerning forthcoming contracts. Thus, they become aware 
of potential contracts very late in the process or even after bids are due. More­
over, the MBE owner often must negotiate alone in the bureaucratic maze that 
often characterizes procurement programs.
Atmosphere refers primarily to the nature of the climate in which nego­
tiations evolve and take place. When the atmosphere of a negotiation is hos­
tile and discriminatory the parties may never reach agreement. The costs of 
this fiasco are borne by both sides, but perhaps more heavily by the MBE. 
There may be several plausible explanations for a hostile atmosphere. First, 
many CPPs have had limited experience dealing with racial and cultural mi­
norities and may have unfavorable preconceived notions about engaging in a 
working relationship with an MBE (Enz et al, 1990). These preconceived no­
tions may be linked to a certain degree of stigmatization associated with be­
ing in an MBE program. Secondly, CPPs report a “backlash” against the ac­
tual and perceived special treatment for, and affirmative action given to, MBEs. 
Therefore, the use of “old-boy networks” composed of “comfortable” vendors 
instead of the employment of competitive bidding may seem to be prudent 
from the CPPs’ viewpoint, but is a violation of purchasing ethics and often 
serves to discriminate against racial and cultural minorities. Therefore, we hy­
pothesize that:
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H5: Due to information asymmetry, MBEs are perceived to incur a
higher cost to procure information than CPPs.
H6: Due to the atmosphere of negotiations, MBEs are perceived to
incur a higher cost of doing business than CPPs.
Avenues for Improving the MBE/CPP Relationship
Activities which may serve to prevent the potential market failure facing 
MBEs and corporations fall into five general categories: (1) monitoring activi­
ties, (2) searching activities, (3) activities designed to improve performance 
quality, (4) activities designed to mitigate the atmosphere problem, and, (5) ac­
tivities which internalize the MBE/CPP relationship (Pearson et al, 1993).
Monitoring activities are designed to provide contracting parties control 
and audit capabilities over the contracting process. Included in this process are 
the MBE purchasing program itself as well as the formal contract negotiation. 
Examples of monitoring activities include performing credit checks on MBEs, 
auditing the corporate MBE purchasing program and monitoring subcontrac­
tors’ compliance with federal regulations. These activities may help to reduce 
uncertainty and information asymmetry by providing the parties with timely 
data.
Monitoring may also mitigate problems of opportunism by reducing the 
chances of non-detection of opportunistic behavior. If each party stands to gain 
from its own opportunism, then it must be deterred in order to provide a cli­
mate conducive to good faith negotiations and for sustenance of a mutually 
beneficial reciprocity norm. Monitoring will enable CPPs to receive assurances, 
through certification of the MBE, that the MBE will help them meet the 
company’s goals and target level of MBE involvement. By the same token, 
MBEs benefit from certification because the process eliminates “front” orga­
nizations that are not truly minority owned and operated, thereby, providing 
maximum opportunity for authentic MBEs. Furthermore, a series of success­
ful certifications for an MBE may enhance its legitimacy and reputation with 
buyers.
Searching activities are designed to assist large companies with identify­
ing potential MBE parties with whom to contract. These search activities may 
include attending MBE trade fairs, placing advertisements in the MBE press 
to publicize opportunities, or automating procurement lists for MBE bidding. 
Search activities represent an effort to overcome the problems of small num­
bers, bureaucratic complexity, and information asymmetry. These activities are 
hypothesized to benefit MBEs because they supplement the MBE’s marketing 
system by bringing the corporate customer directly to the MBE’s door.
Quality assurance activities are designed to increase the probability that 
MBEs will successfully perform the contract. These activities are achieved by 
the large company providing MBEs with management, financial, and technical
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assistance to minimize expense to the MBEs. However, MBEs invest time, en­
ergy, and human resources for these activities. Thus, quality assurance activi­
ties not only cost large companies but MBEs, too.
Cultural interaction activities promote racial and cultural understanding be­
tween the parties. Examples include affirmative action for the hiring of mi­
nority buyers, special training for buyers in the problems of MBEs and 
multicultural diversity, and social events at which MBEs and buyers have the 
opportunity to interact. These activities may partially ameliorate the atmosphere 
problem previously discussed. To the extent that the parties to the contract are 
able to relate to each other well interpersonally, they will be able to conduct 
their negotiations without rancor and racial prejudice.
Internalization activities bring the MBE within the usual arms length con­
tracting relationship. Efforts toward internalization include engaging in joint 
ventures with MBEs, investing in venture capital pools for MBEs, and giving 
MBEs access to corporate training programs. By bringing the MBE partially 
inside the large company, many of the human, environmental, and organiza­
tional barriers may be offset. To the extent that business uncertainty is a cost 
factor, for example, corporate equity participation in the MBE venture may 
help insure the success of the MBE as an on-going firm.
MBEs, therefore, have potentially much to gain by the lowering of the 
transaction costs which may inhibit the success of MBE purchasing programs. 
Thus, MBEs may tend to look more favorably than CPPs upon the policies, 
procedures and activities that remove, shift, delay, or mitigate the incurring of 
transaction costs of MBEs. Typically, these policies and activities have the 
effect of transferring costs to the corporation. CPPs may also favor these poli­
cies and activities but only to the extent that they shift costs away from the 
individual buyer and onto another administrative unit, either somewhere else 
in the organization or outside the organization, (e.g., a governmental agency 
that certifies minority status). Therefore, it is hypothesized that:
H7: MBEs will favor more strongly than CPPs, activities designed
to improve the performance of MBE purchasing programs in 
the following areas: monitoring, searching, quality assurance, 
cultural interaction, and internalization.
Methodology
Sample
A field study was conducted in two phases in order to test the seven hy­
potheses (Dollinger and Daily, 1989). In the first phase, interviews were held 
around the country with the owners of ten MBE firms as well as CPPs from 
thirteen large companies. Corporate participants were selected at random from 
the membership lists of the National Association of Purchasing Management. 
Among the corporate participants in this stage were Northern Telecom, US
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WEST, ARCO, Nabisco Brands, and Eli Lilly. Minority participants were se­
lected from the Try Us ’88 Directory of Minority Business. The interviews 
were conducted at the subjects’ places of business and provided preliminary 
support for the applicability of the TCE framework.
The problems of complexity and bounded rationality emerged from our 
interviews. Subjects repeatedly referred to the problems of the corporate bu­
reaucracy and details of bidding procedures. Both MBEs and corporate pur­
chasing agents were able to give many examples of opportunistic behavior. 
False promises were often mentioned by MBEs as examples. Purchasing per­
sonnel were sensitive to the minority “front” organization.
From the interviews we discerned the issues of small numbers and per­
formance uncertainty. These were emphasized by the purchasing people, but 
also acknowledged as problems by the MBEs. Without a critical mass of high 
quality suppliers, the MBEs felt they were always going to be viewed suspi­
ciously and would incur extra monitoring costs.
Lastly, the “atmosphere” problem was discussed in the interviews. Nei­
ther side was reluctant to talk about racism, although most admitted it was 
usually hidden within the protocols of the bidding procedure. The corporate 
people mentioned what they called a “give-me” attitude that polluted their 
negotiations. The MBEs noted the distasteful remarks and condescending atti­
tudes by purchasing agents.
The initial phase provided the basis for the development of the question­
naire used in phase two. The second phase of this study was then adminis­
tered in three parts. MBEs were surveyed at random from the Try Us ’88 
Directory of Minority Business (Minneapolis, Minn.). Four hundred and sev­
enty five questionnaires were sent, 166 usable responses were received (two 
mailings) for a response rate of 35 percent. The MBEs surveyed represented 
83 different 4-digit SIC codes and 112 different 3-digit ZIP codes. The sec­
ond group sampled consisted of CPPs. Twenty three of 83 firms approached 
from the membership of the National Minority Supplier Development Asso­
ciation agreed to participate (27.7%). From these 23 firms, 547 usable ques­
tionnaires were returned from CPPs—purchasing agents (buyers), their man­
agers, corporate staff involved in MBE purchasing programs, and corporate 
executives with MBE responsibility. The corporate respondents represented 103 
corporate divisions, 102 separate 3-digit ZIP codes and 21 4-digit SIC codes.
Measures
Scales were developed from a list of items to capture the transaction cost 
dimensions and activities (See Appendix A). A factor analysis of scale items 
revealed that uncertainty was two dimensional, therefore two scales, one for 
business uncertainty and one for production uncertainty were created. Similarly, 
monitoring and searching were separated into two dimensions, one for MBEs 
and one for large companies. Quality assurance had three dimensions: finan­
cial, managerial, and technical. Table 1 presents an overview of the measures,
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summary statistics and reliabilities for the scales. In every case, the reliability 
of the measures were well within acceptable standards (Nunnally, 1978).
Table 1
Overview of Dimensions of Transaction Cost and Activities Variables 
DIMENSIONS OF TRANSACTION COST VARIABLES
Com plexity .........................................Costs imposed by complex rules and procedures.
17 items, alpha = .70
Opportunism ................................ Costs of opportunistic, unethical, or illegal behavior.
4 items, alpha = .62
Small Numbers .................................. Costs associated with a small number of sellers.
8 items, alpha = .70
Business U ncertainty......................................................Costs of firm’s uncertain future.
4 items, alpha = .79
Production Uncertainty .........................................Costs of uncertain production quality.
5 items, alpha = .71
Information Asymmetry ........................Costs of both parties not having information.
7 items, alpha = .77
Atmosphere ........................................................................... Costs of hostile environment.
5 items, alpha = .75
Monitoring MBEs .............................................................. Control and audit capabilities.
6 items, alpha = .71
Monitoring Companies ......................................................Control and audit capabilities.
11 items, alpha = .87
Searching for MBEs ............................................. Identification of MBEs for contracts.
6 items, alpha = .64
Searching for Companies .............................. Identification of companies for contracts.
6 items, alpha = .81
Financial A ssurance.........................................Activities to reduce financial uncertainty.
3 items, alpha = .78
Managerial Assurance ................................ Activities to reduce managerial uncertainty.
4 items, alpha = .56
Technical Assurance .......................................Activities to reduce technical uncertainty.
3 items, alpha = .74
Cultural Interaction .................................. Promoting racial and cultural understanding.
3 items, alpha = .64
Internalization................................ Activities to bring MBEs within reach of company.
_________________________________________________________ 4 items, alpha = .78
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Results
Demographics
The MBE sample was mostly nonwhite (84.3%) and male. The respondents 
in the MBE sample who identified themselves as white were either women or may 
have represented a cultural minority such as Hispanic. On the other hand, the CPP 
sample was mostly white. Blacks represented 7.7% of the CPP sample. There was 
no statistical difference in responses based on race. Table 2 presents an overview 
of the characteristics and demographics of the sample.
Table 2
Characteristics of the MBE and CPP Samples
MBE CPP
(n=166) (n=547)
# % # %
Race:
Caucasian 26 (5.7) 474 (86.7)
Black 65 (39.2) 42 (7.7)
Hispanic 41 (24.7) 10 (1.8)
Asian-American 26 (15.7) 8 (1.5)
Native American 8 (4.8) 13 (2.4)
Sex:
Male 109 (65.7) 370 (67.6)
Female 56 (33.7) 174 (31.8)
Not Stated 1 (.6) 3 (.6)
Education:
Less than High School 3 (1.8) 0 (0.0)
High School Graduate 16 (9.6) 38 (6.9)
Some College 43 (25.9) 128 (23.4)
College Graduate 39 (23.5) 203 (37.1)
Some Graduate School 25 (15.1) 100 (18.3)
Graduate Degree 40 (24.1) 74 (13.5)
Age in years: (mean) 45.5 41.4
Tenure on Job in years: (mean) 11.2 5.6
Title (MBE) # %.
Owner 138 (83.1)
Senior Manager 28 (16.9)
Title (CPP): # 3k
Buyer 374 (68.4)
Manager 173 (31.6)
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With regard to education, the CPP group was comprised of more college 
graduates. Interestingly, however, the high percentage of minority respondents 
with graduate degrees (24.1%) suggest that minorities who might otherwise be 
productively employed in large companies, have found an alternative in entre­
preneurship.
There was a statistically significant (F=19.70, pc.001) difference between 
the MBE (11.2 years) and CPPs (5.6 years) for the length of tenure on the 
job. This may be indicative of the turnover which occurs in corporate purchas­
ing. The ownership of a small, established business is apparently a more stable 
endeavor.
The MBE sample was composed of owners (83%) and senior level man­
agers (28%), the people in the best position to know their firm’s experience 
with corporate purchasing programs. Over half of the corporate respondents 
identified themselves as buyers (68.4%), while 31.6 percent identified them­
selves as managers of buyers. The respondents in the CPP sample occupied 
positions which had direct line responsibility for executing MBE purchasing 
programs.
Hypotheses Testing
Hypotheses 1-7 explored whether there were differences between the 
MBEs and CPPs on the following transaction costs: complexity, opportunism, 
small numbers, performance uncertainty, production uncertainty, information 
asymmetry, atmosphere, monitoring of MBEs, monitoring of large companies, 
searching for MBEs, searching for large companies, financial assurance, tech­
nical assurance, managerial assurance, cultural interaction, and internalization. 
To test these hypotheses two sets of analyses were conducted, r-tests were con­
ducted to identify differences between the two groups on each variable. The 
results, as shown in Table 3, revealed that significant differences existed on 
all variables except for two—cost of monitoring MBEs and the small number 
of MBEs. While these results are instructive, a more conservative approach 
would dictate a multi-variate procedure whereby all independent variables can 
be simultaneously assessed.
Accordingly, the next set of analyses relied upon logistic regression for 
hypotheses testing. Because the Wald statistic rapidly loses power as the ab­
solute value of the regression coefficient increases (e.g., Hosmer & Lemeshow, 
1989; Norusis, 1990), we will use the likelihood-ratio (L-R) approach. The L- 
R approach also has the advantage of ease of interpretability inasmuch as it 
can be used as the functional equivalent of hierarchical multiple regression. 
Moreover, the L-R approach also has elements of a discriminant function 
analysis in that it provides familiar “hit-rate” information as well.
Table 4 shows the results of logistic regression analysis. The initial 
(i.e., baseline) log-likelihood statistic was 464.09 (based only on the con­
stant of the regression equation in an L-R approach, not any of the 16 
transaction cost variables ) and the hit-rate was 78.43 percent. This result
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Table 3
t-test for Differences Between MBEs and CPPs 
on Transaction Cost Variables
MBE CPP
Variables Mean Mean t
Complexity 42.28 47.92 -5.80***
Opportunism 21.43 16.18 14.72***
Small Numbers 34.80 34.18 .89
Business Uncertainty 13.63 15.83 -4.38***
Production Uncertainty 18.11 19.47 -291***
Information Asymmetry 35.54 25.93 15.17***
Atmosphere 31.49 23.36 13 21***
Monitoring of MBEs 36.01 36.48 -.88
Monitoring of Corps. 62.44 54.63 7 94***
Searching for MBEs 34.22 30.66 7 39***
Searching for Corps. 35.56 31.08 9 9Q***
Financial Assistance 14.48 9.46 12.23***
Managerial Assistance 22.07 21.14 2.64**
Technical Assistance 15.03 12.28 7 77***
Cultural Interaction 16.71 15.17 5 04***
Internalization 20.99 16.40 10.34***
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
Table 4
Results of Logistic Regression Model
Variables Log- Model Chi- Model Sig. Hit Rate
Likelihood Square Improve
Baseline 464.09 .000 • 78.43










is intuitive. Based on the sample itself, we know that 78.43 percent of the 
subjects are corporate. Clearly, then, any observer would simply choose the 
corporate designation if asked to guess which category that any given data
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point might appear. This person would be correct, of course, some 78.43 
percent of the time.
The next step considers the importance of the inclusion of independent 
variables into the model. Initially, 16 variables were entered. Based on an it­
erative procedure, the L-R approach evaluates each variable in turn and deter­
mines which subset of independent variables results in the most robust model. 
Table 4 in the “final model” section illustrates the results of this procedure. 
Notice that only variables (1) MBEs searching for large companies, (2) finan­
cial assurance, (3) managerial assurance, (4) atmosphere, (5) internalization, (6) 
small numbers, (7) production uncertainty, (8) opportunism, and, (9) informa­
tion asymmetry are so included. The final model log likelihood is 248.13, for 
a model chi-square and improvement chi-square of 215.96 (pc.OOO). Notice, 
too, that the hit rate has been improved to 88.54 percent. From this we see 
that the inclusion of: MBEs searching for large companies, financial assurance, 
managerial assurance, atmosphere, internalization, small numbers, production 
uncertainty, opportunism, and information asymmetry result in a far more ro­
bust model.
Table 5 provides a more precise indication of the contribution of inde­
pendent variables to the model. As expected, all variables in the final model 
are statistically significant. In addition, the odds ratio (noted as exp[B] in Table 
5) provides some indication of the magnitude of contribution as well. An odds 
ratio of “1,” for example, would indicate no relationship with the dependent 
variable. Such a variable, of course, would not be included in the final model. 
As odds ratios deviate from 1, greater absolute deviations are properly inter­
preted as stronger individual relationships with the dependent variable. Accord­
ingly, it would seem that, while all the included variables are statistically sig­
nificant, managerial assurance, atmosphere, and opportunism provide the great­
est explanatory power.
Table 5
Logistic Coefficients in Final Model
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig R Exp(B)
Search for Company -.1594 .0416 14.7048 1 .0001 -.1655 .8526
Financial .1864 .0565 10.8798 1 .0010 -.1383 .8299
Managerial .3104 .0624 24.7393 1 .0000 .2214 1.3639
Atmosphere .1962 .0732 - 7.1801 1 .0074 .1056 1.2168
Internalization -.1417 .0587 5.8356 1 .0157 -.0909 .8678
Small Numbers .1014 .0312 10.5582 1 .0012 .1358 1.1067
Production Uncertainty .0986 .0365 7.3056 1 .0069 .1069 1.1036
Uncertainty
Opportunism -.2583 .0534 23.3733 1 .0000 .2146 .7723
Information Asymmetry -.0838 .0304 7.5804 1 .0059 -.1097 .9196
Constant 3.8522 1.2616 9.3236 1 .0023
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Discussion
The results of this study demonstrate that MBEs and their corporate pur­
chasing counterparts have different perceptions across all three dimensions of 
transaction costs: human, environmental, and organizational (Hypotheses 1-6). 
MBEs and purchasing personnel differed on all the variables except the ef­
fects of small numbers. These differences empirically demonstrate, the prob­
lems that MBEs have in selling to large companies and the problems that 
MBEs and purchasing personnel have in implementing MBE purchasing pro­
grams, in reaching agreement in the marketplace, and in collectively pursuing 
the economic development of the minority business community.
For the MBE, the stakes of successfully participating in an MBE purchas­
ing program are quite high; therefore, they view the transaction costs as 
hurdles to be overcome regardless of cost (to the large company). Corporate 
purchasing people have a lower stake in the problem. While they too identify 
transaction costs as hurdles, they are rather less willing to engage in costly 
activities to overcome barriers to contracting. On all of the activities variables 
(i.e., activities to prevent MBEs from market failure with large companies), 
except monitoring of MBEs, there was a significant difference between the 
MBEs and CPPs (Hypothesis 7). Thus, when considered in tandem with the 
results of the analysis of the transaction costs variables, the implication here 
is that MBE purchasing programs do not prevent “market failure.” The trans­
action costs which impede contracting between minority firms and large com­
panies are borne more heavily by MBE firms, and activities designed to shift 
or remove these costs are less favored by corporate personnel.
Although the mission of MBE purchasing programs, to increase MBE pro­
curement, is simple, the implementation of these programs is complex and 
challenging. Within an efficiency context, the logic of MBE procurement 
would dictate the internalization, or takeover, of these minority firms. This, of 
course, is a common reaction by large companies experiencing supply prob­
lems. However, this strategy fails to meet federal guidelines or social objec­
tives. Based on this study, it can be concluded that currently MBE purchasing 
programs are ineffective as a means of equalizing or mitigating MBE transac­
tion costs. Structures designed to reduce or shift transaction costs for both 
MBEs and corporate personnel would seem to be in the interests of both.
Implications for MBEs
The results of the study suggest that selling to large companies is not a 
panacea for MBEs, especially those that utilize the MBE purchasing programs. 
For all of the benefits derived from having large corporate customers, MBEs 
still incur costs. These costs are inherent in the transaction, and may not be 
recognized directly as accounting type costs, but they nonetheless reduce the 
effectiveness of the MBE firm. MBEs would be advised to broaden their cus­
tomer base beyond corporate purchasing programs and sell to other small firms
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and mid- to large-size firms that do not have special MBE purchasing respon­
sibilities.
A second recommendation for the MBE owners is for them to recognize 
that there are structural impediments that occur when selling to a large com­
pany; that is, not all conflict is racially motivated. When transaction costs are 
present, the MBE can do at least three things to make it easier for the corpo­
ration to do business. First, MBEs should freely provide information to reduce 
uncertainty about their business operations and their capabilities to deliver 
quality goods and services. Secondly, MBEs should request information from 
corporations concerning their procurement needs, policies and timetables be­
fore becoming involved in costly and prolonged negotiations and conflicts. 
This information seeking would help to reduce the information asymmetry 
which currently exists. The prepared MBE helps reduce the costs of complex­
ity by being prepared for the transaction.
A final recommendation for MBEs is for them to make use of organiza­
tions which exist to reduce the transaction costs between large companies and 
MBEs (e.g., Regional Supplier Development Councils). Effective liaisons are 
designed to be matchmakers and bring MBEs together with corporate manag­
ers who have procurement responsibilities. They also help to monitor MBE and 
corporate behavior within these transactions, and can serve as ombudsman for 
either side when the transaction costs increase such that they threaten the re­
lationship.
Implications for Corporate Management
The present study suggests new directions for MBE purchasing programs. 
The first recommendation for CPPs and MBEs is to work harder at implement­
ing the programs as they are now configured. This means addressing the im­
pediments directly and focusing on those activities which reduce transaction 
costs between MBEs and CPPs. Reducing complexity, increasing the pool of 
qualified MBEs, improving the atmosphere for negotiations, encouraging trust 
while implementing disincentives for opportunistic behavior, minimizing busi­
ness uncertainty, and keeping information lines open in both directions may 
have this effect. However, it serves to the advantage of the CPP, not MBE.
A second recommendation is to employ mechanisms to shift transactions 
costs away from the decision makers, namely, the CPPs and the MBE own­
ers. This may uncouple the decision to contract from the high costs of execut­
ing and monitoring the contract. Administrative units or personnel are needed 
to absorb these shifted costs. This could take the form of staff specialists who 
are outside of purchasing, specialists within purchasing but not responsible for 
contract negotiating, or units outside of the firm altogether such as Minority 
Purchasing councils. Effective Minority Purchasing Councils are capable of 
absorbing these transaction costs (and covering the expense with its dues and 
membership fees) and facilitating agreements. They can also provide econo­
mies of scale (size) and scope (range of activities) that a single purchasing
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organization can not achieve. However, it is recognized that the Minority Pur­
chasing councils may also have problems similar to those faced by the MBE: 
barriers and insufficient power.
A third recommendation addresses the criteria for evaluating the results 
of MBE purchasing programs. It is recommended that corporations adopt mul­
tiple criteria for evaluating their programs and the performance of their pur­
chasing personnel. Quantitative goals like total sales dollars and the federal 
quota are useful, but limited. Indeed, sometimes these targets can be used 
against promoting minority business because a filled quota is often frowned 
upon and an unattainable dollar figure (in the absence of sanctions) tends to 
make people cynical. Qualitative goals and criteria with the flexibility to al­
low many different modes of success are recommended to augment current 
methods.
The final recommendation is to experiment with some innovative pro­
grams suggested by the results of the study. These innovations fall under the 
heading of “internalization.” They require the mixing of corporate and MBE 
resources, assets, money and people in a manner that is less than arms-length 
contracting. Internalization is a way to bring the MBE and corporation together 
either physically or contractually for a self-defined limited time period, so that, 
once the firms are separated and once again legally distinct, the transaction 
costs will be permanently reduced. An MBE incubator facility, for example, 
would reduce the business and production uncertainty transaction costs factors 
by providing resources and by securing monitoring capability. An incubator 
facility is an overhead sharing device that allows a number of small businesses 
to share space costs, administrative overhead, and specialist employees. With 
corporate financial assistance and monitoring, an incubator would enable CPPs 
to directly observe the progress of the MBEs, and enable the MBEs immedi­
ate access to corporate personnel and information. The MBEs would no longer 
be “outsiders” with all the barriers of selling to a large company to overcome.
Another example of internalization would be a program similar to an af­
firmative action program for recruiting college students. Except with this pro­
gram, minority students would be recruited for special training with the goal 
of eventually pursuing an entrepreneurial opportunity. During the minority 
person’s training, he or she would be exposed to the large company’s opera­
tions which might be best suited to MBE procurement. Then, when the trainee 
leaves the company, that individual is uniquely suited to act as a supplier to 
his or her prior employer. While it is recognized that this may be a relatively 
expensive program for the large company, it serves the purpose of lowering 
the transaction costs of later procurement. There is also potential for product 
innovation and development.
Implications for Human Resources Management
There are implications from the findings for human resources management 
for the large company as well as the MBE. These implications are grounded
in the basic premise of TCE. According-to Ouchi (1980), organizations can 
rely upon socialization as an efficient, and the principle mechanism, for me­
diation or control. Socialization is necessary because new or prospective em­
ployees will not share the same devotion to the values and mission of the or­
ganization. Such socialization would allow the basis for reciprocity to be es­
tablished and maintained among employees of both parties. However, it is im­
portant for both parties to recognize that the socialization is more than mere 
discussions about what is valued at the company (be it an MBE or large com­
pany), but an inclusive approach to shaping employees’ behavior. We believe 
companies should be more socially responsible to minority firms therefore, so­
cialization would consist of formal and informal programs for teaching new 
employees about the values and philosophy of the firm as well as the procure­
ment programs and their purpose, a mechanism for evaluating performance, 
and a reward system designed to further reinforce the company’s value of 
working with minority firms. For it is through common values and beliefs that 
the occurrence of opportunistic behavior is mitigated, if not eliminated. It is 
also through this process of socialization that the nature of the MBE/CPP re­
lationship is more fully understood, hopefully, to the extent that any stigmati­
zation for MBE participation is erased.
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Appendix A
Minority Business Enterprise Purchasing Program Survey
The purpose of this survey is to investigate some of the issues of Minority 
Business Enterprise (MBE) purchasing programs and the potential solutions to 
these problems. Your cooperation is vital. Please answer all of the questions 
as best you can. Your answers are completely confidential; only the research­
ers at the Center for Advanced Purchasing Studies and Indiana University will 
see this survey. Thank you for your help.
Instructions: On the following pages are statements used to describe prob­
lems of Minority Business Enterprise (MBE) purchasing programs. Read each 
statement carefully and think about your own company. Then indicate whether 
you (1) Strongly Disagree, (2) Moderately Disagree, (3) Slightly Disagree, 
(4) Neither Agree nor Disagree, (5) Slightly Agree, (6) Moderately Agree, 
or (7) Strongly Agree with the statement by circling the appropriate number 
next to the statement.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Moderately Slightly Neither Slightly Moderately Strongly 
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Nor Agree Agree Agree
________________________________ Disagree_______________
1. Doing business with large corporations is not very profitable for 
MBEs.
2. Finding contracts to bid is time-consuming for MBEs.
3. MBEs have difficulty advertising their products/services.
4. Corporations apply their purchasing regulations inconsistently.
5. It is difficult for MBEs to get information from corporations.
6. Corporations don’t get the word out about their MBE programs.
7. It is hard to match the MBE firm with the corporation’s need.
8. The designation of “minority business” hurts MBEs.
9. Subcontractors don’t help MBEs.
10. MBEs can’t compete with bigger firms.
11. Buyers don’t know much about minority-owned firms.
12. MBEs need technical assistance.
13. Buyers are inconsistent in implementing the MBE program.
14. Buyers use MBEs just to satisfy statistics.
15. Buyers don’t work closely with MBEs.
16. Corporatons don’t give much feedback to MBEs.
17. Corporations take too long to pay.
18. It’s hard for MBEs to get their foot in the door.
19. MBEs become disillusioned with corporate bureaucracy.
20. MBEs are often undercapitalized.
21. There is a lack of corporate commitment to MBE purchasing 
programs.
1 2  3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2  3 4 5 6 7 
1 2  3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2  3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2  3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Appendix A
Minority Business Enterprise Purchasing Program Survey cont’d
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Moderately Slightly Neither Slightly Moderately Strongly
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Nor Agree Agree Agree
__________Disagree _____________________________
22. MBEs are powerless to negotiate favorable terms.
23. Cultural misunderstandings hurt MBE purchasing programs.
24. MBEs need long lead times to correct quality problems.
25. Buyers rely on their “old-boy networks” for supplies.
26. Only small-volume orders are placed with MBEs.
27. The government doesn’t enforce the regulations on MBE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
purchasing.
28. Lead times for MBE quotes are too short.
29. Lead times for MBE deliveries are too short.
30. MBEs are not available in specialized areas.
31. Buyers are not aware of available MBEs.
32. MBEs don’t expand their businesses to meet corporate needs.
33. MBEs are naive/inexperienced with the corporate world.
34. MBEs are not price-competitive.
35. Buyers lack information on MBE capability.
36. MBEs can’t handle the paperwork.
37. MBEs can’t meet bid/quote deadlines.
38. MBEs hide problems that they are having.
39. Racial biases hurt MBE purchasing programs.
40. Buyers have no incenteive to make MBE purchasing 
program work.
41. MBEs have a “give-me” attitude.
42. The MBE pruchasing program is all politics.
43. MBEs are clustered in a few industry areas.
44. MBEs are clustered in a few geographic areas.
45. Performance by MBEs is too uncertain.
46. MBEs have poor bidding practices.
47. Buyers feel stress and conflict reaching MBE purchasing goals.
48. MBEs have inefficient production capacities.
49. Subcontractors are impossible to monitor.
50. MBE distributor and wholesale business blocked by
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
national agreements.
51. Unions prevent subcontracting to MBEs.
52. Corporate resources to develop MBEs is a costly process.
53. Corporations don’t have the imagination to make MBE 
programs work.
54. Identifying and qualifying MBEs is a costly process.
55. Individual buyers are out on their own when it comes to 
MBE programs.
56. High buyer turnover hurts long-term relationships with MBEs.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Appendix A
Minority Business Enterprise Purchasing Program Survey cont’d
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Moderately Slightly Neither Slightly Moderately Strongly
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Nor 
Disagree
Agree Agree Agree
57. MBE purchasing programs are at odds with efficient purchasing 
practice.
58. MBE programs lead buyers to compromise their professional 
standards.
59. MBEs have high failure rates.
60. MBEs sometimes act as a “front” for non-minority business.
61. MBEs lack qualified engineering personnel.
62. MBEs lack qualified managerial personnel.
63 MBEs lack qualified sales personnel.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2  3 4 5 6 7
Instructions: Below are activities that are sometimes used to implement aspects of 
Minority Business Enterprise (MBE) purchasing programs. Read each statement care­
fully and think about your own company. Then indicate whether you (1) Strongly Dis­
agree, (2) Moderately Disagree, (3) Slightly Disagree, (4) Neither Agree nor Dis­
agree, (5) Slightly Agree, (6) Moderately Agree, or (7) Strongly Agree that the ac­
tivity should be part of a large corporation’s MBE program by circling the appropriate 
number next to the statement.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Moderately Slightly Neither Slightly Moderately Strongly
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Nor 
Disagree
Agree Agree Agree
This item should be part of a large company’s MBE purchasing program
1. Provide or use a certification process.
2. Offer management assistance.
3. Engage in joint ventures.
4. Employ company expediters to offer aid to MBEs.
5. Give MBEs access to company technical resources.
6. Make company internal training available to MBEs.
7. Sponsor MBE attendance at business education programs.
8. Offer materials management and supply help.
9. Hold quality assurance meetings.
10. Offer loans or loan guarantees to MBEs.
11. Offer subsidies to MBEs.
12. Develop national agreements with black/Hispanic groups.
13. Attend MBE trade fairs.
14. Place ads in the minority press.
15. Establish prepayment agreements.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
64 Journal of Business Strategies Vol. 13, No. 1
Appendix A
Minority Business Enterprise Purchasing Program Survey cont’d
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Moderately Slightly Neither Slightly Moderately Strongly
Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Nor 
Disagree
Agree Agree Agree
17. Invest in venture capital pools for MBEs. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
18. Waive restrictive requirements. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
19. Employ automated monitoring/tracking of MBE agreements. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
20. Monitor MBE participation in subcontracts. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
21. Implement program audits. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
22. Help with bid preparation. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
23. Train purchasing agents in problems of MBEs. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
24. Require performance bonds. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
25. Perform credit checks. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
26. Check references. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
27. Check letters of credit. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
28. Set specific purchasing target goals for MBEs. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
29. Establish an MBE advocate program within the company. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
30. Develop capability to monitor MBE purchases. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
31. Visibility and commendations for buyer participation in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
MBE program.
32. Get top management involved in MBE purchasing program. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
33. Organize a permanent in-house task force. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
34. Offer monetary incentives for buyers who meet or exceed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
MBE goals.
35. Take a leadership role in MBE economic development in the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
community.
36. Challenge non-minority suppliers to become involved. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
37. Simplify bidding process. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
38. Have an MBE vendor listing available to all departments. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
39. Establish an MBE program in every department. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
40. Employ automated data bases for MBE procurement. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
41. Disseminate long-term purchasing. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
42. Provide feedback to unsuccessful bidders. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
43. Publish general information on supply procudures. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
44. Publish list of buyer names. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
45. Publish list of commodities sought. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
46. List large volume opportunities. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
